Labor-Leisure Choice
This section extends the baseline model by allowing the household to choose the amount of time consumed as leisure. For simplicity, I abstract from altruistic bequests. In order to determine how abstracting from leisure choice affects the outcomes of the policy experiments, I also study a special case of the model in which leisure is fixed.
Household Problem
The structure of the household problem is as follows. The household first solves the problem of lifetime utility maximization conditional on choosing each schooling level. The household then picks the level of s with the highest utility net of education costs.
Household Problem for Given (q, s)
Once the household has chosen a schooling level s, his optimization problem is as follows. 
) , ( max 0 λ and µ denote Lagrange multipliers. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are:
is the marginal wage rate after taxes.
is the marginal cost of x to the household.
Here, it is understood that the previous four equations only hold for a = a S +1, …, a R − 2. At age a R − 1, the household does not invest in human capital and v b,a = x b,a = µ b,a = 0 and l b,a = l R which is the exogenous level of leisure during retirement. During schooling (a = a S ) the household enjoys the exogenous leisure level l S and job-training investment is, of course, zero.
The first-order conditions can be simplified as follows. Leisure is determined by The law of motion for the shadow price of human capital is
A solution of the household problem then consists of age profiles for c, l, v, x, h, µ and a scalar λ that solve (1), (3), (6), (8), (9), (10), and the present value budget constraint (2). Asset holdings follow residually from the flow budget constraint.
If leisure is fixed, the problem is modified as follows. The first-order condition for leisure (4) is replaced by an exogenous age-leisure profile. The other conditions determining household behavior and equilibrium remain unchanged.
Note that the problem with fixed leisure is still not identical to the one reported in the main text. One minor difference is that the agents' endowment available for market time differs from the one in the main text. A more important difference is due to a peculiar feature of the household problem adopted from Heckman et al. (1998 Heckman et al. ( , 1999 . In their education choice the households maximize the present value of earnings despite the fact that utility consists not only of the discounted stream of the u(c b,a ), but also subtracts the nonpecuniary education cost p s . In the main text I nonetheless adopt Heckman et al.'s formulation because it provides a well-known and empirically successful benchmark model of education choice. Moreover, none of the results reported in the paper are modified, if agents are assumed to choose the education level that yields maximum lifetime utility instead. In other words, the model with fixed leisure presented in this appendix yields the same qualitative insights as the model presented in the main text.
Solution Algorithm
The household problem is solved by iterating over guesses for λ b , h b,a , and v b,a . Given λ, the first-order condition for consumption (3) determines the marginal utility of consumption in all periods. The first-order condition (8) determines c / l. Together, these can be solved for the levels of c and l at all dates. The shadow price µ is then updated using (7), starting from the last date using the guesses for v, x, h and the updated l. Next, the guess for v is updated by solving (5) for v:
. The values of x are obtained from the identity
Finally, the guesses for h are updated by iterating over its law of motion.
Functional Forms
The utility function is
and
When l is interior, consumption is then determined by (3) together with
When l is fixed, as during retirement, consumption is determined by (3) together with
Education Choice
After solving the above problem for each possible choice of s, the household compares the present discounted values of utility associated with each choice. It chooses the level of s that offers the largest present value of utility, net of its idiosyncratic draw of the non-pecuniary education cost. The education cost is determined as in the main text.
Equilibrium
The definition of competitive equilibrium is nearly the same as for the baseline model. Leisure 
Parameters
The only parameters that need to be chosen in addition to those described in the main text are 
Results
This section presents numerical simulation results for the same experiments as reported in the main text, except that the household is now allowed to choose labor supply. The calculations
show that all of the findings reported in the paper continue to hold. Labor-leisure choice alters the outcomes of most experiment substantially, but the comparisons between models with alternative assumptions about intergenerational persistence are similar to those reported in the paper.
First, consider experiments that do not directly distort job-training decisions. Table 1 shows the changes in aggregates due to a move from progressive to proportional income taxation.
The first column shows the outcomes for the model with fixed leisure and no intergenerational [INSERT 
Alternative Policy Experiments
This section reports the outcomes for several policy experiments commonly studied in the literature. The main conclusion is that in each case a conventional life-cycle model yields outcomes that are quite similar to the baseline model with realistic intergenerational mobility.
The first experiment is a revenue neutral move to a consumption tax (see Heckman et al. 1999; Davies and Whalley 1991) . This experiment sets all income tax rates to zero and adjusts the consumption tax rate to maintain government revenues unchanged. The results are reported in table 3, which mirrors the structure of table 4 in the text. The first column shows the changes in aggregates generated by a standard life-cycle model. The second column adds intergenerational persistence of education. The third column adds persistence of ability and represents the findings from a model with realistic intergenerational mobility. As in the proportional tax experiment, intergenerational persistence has little impact on the tax effects. Table 4 shows the results from eliminating capital income taxation, which is a commonly studied tax reform in the literature (e.g., Lucas 1990, Davies and Whalley 1991) . The wage tax rate is adjusted to maintain constant government revenues. The conclusions for transitional dynamics are similar. To illustrate, figure 1 shows the trajectory of aggregate output following the move to consumption taxation (the experiment underlying table 3). The trajectory generated by the model without intergenerational persistence is close to those of the baseline model with realistic persistence. Table 6 replicates an experiment of Davies and Whalley (1991) . It is a move from proportional income to consumption taxation, where job-training investment is not taxdeductible. The initial steady state has proportional labor and capital income taxes (τ K = 0.5; τ w = 0.2). The non-deductibility of job-training inputs is captured by setting τ x = −τ w . The experiment sets income tax rates and τ x to zero. A consumption tax is introduced that keeps tax revenues unchanged. For this experiment, intergenerational persistence magnifies the tax effects by similar amounts as for the job-training subsidy studied in the main text. In both cases output increases by an additional 1.5% due to intergenerational persistence.
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[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Galton coefficient for earnings ----12.9
Tables for Technical Appendix
Percentage point changes Galton coefficient for earnings ----13.9
Percentage point changes College labor input (L 2 ) 9.4 9.3 10.9
High school wage rate (ω 1 ) 9.1 9.0 8.9
College wage rate (ω 2 ) 5.5 5.6 5.4
Quintile ratio -2.1 -1.9 -1.9
College premium 80.4 83.1 79.9
Galton coefficient for earnings ----8.7
Percentage point changes 
